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A B S T R A C T
This paper summarises the results from a blind-prediction benchmark study for models used for estimating the
consequences of vented hydrogen deflagrations, as well as for users of such models. The work was part of the
HySEA project that received funding from the Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (FCH JU) under grant
agreement no. 671461. The first blind-prediction benchmark exercise in the HySEA project focused on vented
explosions with homogeneous hydrogen-air mixtures in 20-foot ISO containers. The scenarios selected for the
second blind-prediction study focused on vented deflagrations in inhomogeneous hydrogen-air mixtures re-
sulting from continuous stratification of hydrogen during vertical jet releases inside 20-foot ISO containers. The
deflagrations were vented through commercial vent panels located on the roof of the containers.
The test program included two configurations and four experiments, i.e. two repeated tests for each scenario.
The paper compares experimental results and model predictions and discusses the implications of the findings
for safety related to hydrogen applications. Several modellers predicted the stratification of hydrogen inside the
container during the release phase with reasonable accuracy. However, there is significant spread in the model
predictions, especially for the maximum reduced explosion pressure, and including predictions from different
modellers using the same model system. The results from the blind-prediction benchmark studies performed as
part of the HySEA project constitute a strong incentive for developers of consequence models to improve their
models, implement automated procedures for scenario definition and grid generation, and update training and
guidelines for users of the models.
1. Introduction
This section describes the motivation and context for the blind-
prediction benchmark study.
1.1. Vented hydrogen deflagrations
Several properties of hydrogen differ significantly from most con-
ventional and alternative fuels (Astbury, 2008). The low boiling point
of liquid hydrogen and the low density of gaseous hydrogen, relative to
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air, implies that loss of containment in confined spaces is likely to result
in stratified mixtures (Gallego et al., 2007; Makarov et al., 2018).
Furthermore, due to the low ignition energy and wide flammability
range of hydrogen-air mixtures (Ono et al., 2007), fires and explosions
represent a significant hazard for most hydrogen installations.
Hydrogen deflagrations in stratified mixtures are inherently com-
plex phenomena. The laminar burning velocity of hydrogen-air mix-
tures is significantly higher than for most conventional and alternative
fuels (Konnov et al., 2018), and various hydrodynamic, thermo-diffu-
sive and thermo-acoustic instabilities may influence the flame (Clavin
and Searby, 2016). The role of thermo-diffusive instabilities will de-
pend on the mixture composition (Sánchez and Williams, 2014): cel-
lular instabilities occur at sufficiently fuel-lean conditions (negative
Markstein lengths), and pulsating instabilities occur at sufficiently fuel-
rich conditions (positive Markstein lengths).
Most accidental gas explosions in industry entail transient turbulent
flame propagation in geometries with various degree of congestion and
confinement. Of particular concern for hydrogen-air mixtures is the
propensity to undergo deflagration-to-detonation-transition (DDT)
under certain conditions (Ciccarelli and Dorofeev, 2008). To this end,
specific measures are generally required for reducing the explosion risk
in hydrogen systems to a tolerable level (Dorofeev et al., 1994; Crowl
and Jo, 2007; Rigas and Amyotte, 2013; Fuster et al., 2017; Skjold
et al., 2017, 2018; Moradi and Groth, 2019).
Explosion mitigation by venting is frequently used for reducing the
consequences of hydrogen deflagrations in confined systems (Bauwens
et al., 2011, 2012; Bauwens and Dorofeev, 2014; Skjold et al., 2019b).
However, it is not straightforward to design optimal systems for ex-
plosion protection. By varying parameters such as leak location, leak
direction, leak rate, leak profile/duration, natural ventilation, forced
ventilation and ignition position, numerous accident scenarios can be
realised for a given installation. Furthermore, the phenomena involved
are inherently complex, including the turbulent combustion and the
two-way interaction between the transient pressure load from the ex-
plosion and the structural response of the enclosure and the venting
device. The limited repeatability of large-scale deflagration experiments
in congested geometries suggests that the chain of events is highly
sensitive to the initial and boundary conditions (Evans et al., 1999;
Skjold, 2018b; Skjold et al., 2019a).
Models for estimating the consequences of vented hydrogen defla-
grations range from empirical or semi-empirical correlations (Razus
and Krause, 2001; Sustek and Janovsky, 2013), to advanced model
systems based on computational fluid dynamics (CFD) and finite ele-
ment (FE) methods. Of particular concern from a modelling point of
view, and especially for engineering calculations performed as part of
risk assessments, are the inherent limitations concerning the spatial and
temporal scales that can be resolved. Model developers must inevitably
strike a balance between the accuracy and predictive capabilities of the
model, calculation time, and the efforts required by users of the models
to generate reliable results. Another relevant consideration is the level
of conservatism incorporated in the model, given the inherent un-
certainty and variability in experimental data for model validation. To
this end, it is essential to validate and document the performance of
consequence models for vented hydrogen deflagrations against large-
scale experiments (Skjold et al., 2013).
1.2. Previous work
Vented hydrogen deflagrations have been extensively studied in the
past, but primarily for initially quiescent mixtures ignited to deflagra-
tion in empty enclosures (Razus and Krause, 2001; Bauwens et al.,
2011, 2012; Sustek and Janovsky, 2013; Bauwens and Dorofeev, 2014;
Molkov and Bragin, 2015). Sommersel et al. (2008, 2017) investigated
the effect of initial turbulence and congestion for vented hydrogen
explosions in a 20-foot ISO container. Hooker et al. (2017) described an
experimental program with vented deflagrations in a 31m3 low
strength enclosure, conducted as part of the HyIndoor project.
Several blind-prediction benchmark studies have been conducted
for hydrogen in the past (Gallego et al., 2007; García et al., 2010;
Makarov et al., 2009; Baraldi et al. 2010, 2017; Skjold et al., 2019a).
Baraldi et al. (2010) highlighted the need for blind-prediction bench-
mark studies for proper evaluation of the predictive capabilities of
consequence models.
1.3. The HySEA project
The primary objective of the project Improving Hydrogen Safety for
Energy Applications through pre-normative research on vented deflagrations
(HySEA) was to develop recommendations for improved international
standards for the design of explosion venting protective systems, such
as EN 14994 (2007) and NFPA 68 (2018). The members of the HySEA
consortium were Gexcon (coordinator), University of Warwick
(UWAR), University of Pisa (UNIPI), Fike Europe, Impetus Afea and
Hefei University of Technology (HFUT). The HySEA project included
two blind-prediction benchmark studies where modellers were invited
to submit model prediction for well-defined vented deflagration sce-
narios before the completion of the actual experiments. The results from
the first study (Skjold et al., 2019a), which focused on vented defla-
grations in homogeneous lean hydrogen-air mixtures, revealed sig-
nificant spread in the model predictions, for CFD codes as well as
simpler models based on empirical or semi-empirical correlations. This
paper presents the results from the second blind-prediction benchmark
study in the HySEA project.
1.4. The second HySEA blind-prediction benchmark study
The experimental program in the HySEA project included 66 vented
hydrogen deflagration experiments performed in 20-foot shipping
containers: 42 tests with initially homogeneous and quiescent mixtures,
and 24 tests with inhomogeneous mixtures (Skjold, 2018a,b; Skjold
et al., 2019b). The total number of tests was 72, which included five
unignited dispersion tests and one failed test. The scenarios selected for
the second HySEA blind-prediction benchmark exercise involved con-
tinuous stratification of hydrogen and subsequent ignition to deflagra-
tion and explosion venting through commercial vent panels.
The members of the HySEA consortium invited researchers and
engineers to submit model predictions before the actual experiments
were performed. The call for model predictions was published on the
HySEA website and distributed by e-mail. The University of Pisa col-
lected the model predictions submitted within the deadline on 30
November 2017. Three commissioning tests without ignition were
completed in October 2017 (Table 1), but the results were not com-
municated to the modellers. Seven individuals/groups submitted pre-
dictions obtained with CFD tools, and one group submitted predictions
from various models based on empirical or semi-empirical correlations.
Table 1
Test matrix for the second HySEA blind-prediction benchmark exercise, in-
cluding commissioning tests and reference tests with homogeneous mixtures.
Test Date Av (m2) Ign. Cn (vol.%) Geo. Tamb (oC)
T39 19.10.2017 ‒ ‒ 21 (nominal) P2 9± 2
T42 23.10.2017 ‒ ‒ 21 (nominal) FO 12±2
T43 23.10.2017 ‒ ‒ 21 (nominal) FO 14±2
T46 30.10.2017 6.0 BU 21 (homog.) FO 6±2
T47 17.11.2017 6.0 BU 21 (homog.) FO 6±2
T48 17.11.2017 6.0 BU 21 (homog.) P2 7± 2
T57* 30.11.2017 6.0 BU 21 (nominal) FO -3± 2
T59 05.01.2018 6.0 BU 21 (nominal) FO -3± 2
T60* 08.01.2018 6.0 BU 21 (nominal) P2 3± 2
T61* 09.01.2018 6.0 BU 21 (nominal) P2 0± 2
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2. Experiments
This section describes the test rig, measurement system and ex-
perimental procedure, as described in the call for model predictions for
the blind-prediction benchmark study.
2.1. Test rig
Gexcon performed the experiments in 20-foot containers at the re-
mote test site on the island of Sotra outside Bergen. The experimental
rig used for the HySEA experiments consisted of a standard 20-foot ISO
container fitted with a steel frame on the floor. The purpose of the steel
frame was to support obstacles and instrumentation inside the con-
tainer and to fix the container to a solid foundation. Fig. 1 shows one of
the twelve containers used in the experimental campaign (left) and the
interior of a container ready for testing (right). The red arrow indicates
the position and direction of the jet release. Fig. 2 shows the steel frame
(the white structure on the floor in Fig. 1) placed on top of the foun-
dation during the construction of the test rig.
Fig. 3 shows the overall dimensions of the steel frame and the po-
sition of the eight bolts used for fixing the frame and container to the
foundation. The foundation was made from two 360-mm H-beams,
which implies that the bottom of the container was positioned 0.36m
above ground level during testing. The steel frame was constructed
from U-beams (UNP 200, Fig. 3). The U-beams positioned along the
back wall and along both side-walls of the container had the flat side
facing the container walls to minimise flame acceleration in the gap
between the frame and the corrugated wall.
Fig. 4 summarises the overall dimensions of the containers. The
inner dimensions were 5.87m×2.35m×2.39m, for a total volume of
about 33m2. The floor inside the containers was covered with plywood,
and the walls and the roof were made of corrugated steel plates. The
level of the floor was about 0.50m above ground level during testing.
The depth of the corrugations in the walls was 35mm, one ‘period’ of
corrugation 280mm, and the plate thickness 2.0 mm.
The corrugated plate on the roof of the containers was replaced with
a tailor-made steel frame that supported the vent panels. This frame
was made from 100mm×100mm square pipes and a
100mm×80mm rectangular pipe along the centre. Eight chains
tightened with turnbuckles connected the frame on the roof to the
frame on the floor inside the container (Fig. 1). Six of the eight
1.0 m×1.0m openings were covered with single-sheet bulged vent
panels with vent area Av 1.0m2 and nominal static opening pressure
Pstat 100mbar. The remaining openings in the roof were closed with
blind flanges. Fig. 5 illustrates the position of the vent panels, ignition
source, pipe rack and jet release. The dimensions of the two blocked
openings towards the container doors were 1.0 m×0.56m. Fig. 6
shows a container with six panels (Av=6.0m2) before and after a test
(container doors on the left).
Fig. 7 shows the pipe rack obstacle. The obstacle consisted of a steel
frame made from 100mm×100mm square pipes. This frame sup-
ported four layers of round pipes: two shelves with five pipes each, pipe
diameter 104mm, 200mm spacing, and fixed with U-bolts, and two
shelves with 22 pipes in two layers, pipe diameter 20mm, 100mm
spacing in horizontal direction, 33 mm spacing in vertical direction,
and fixed with standard support clamps for hydraulic pipes. All pipes
were 1200mm long. The shelves for fixing the pipes were made from
50mm×50mm angle steel, with heights above the floor of the con-
tainer of 600, 800, 1100 and 1400mm. The pipe rack was fixed with
brackets to the frame inside the container. Fig. 1 (right) shows the pipe
rack mounted in the centre position, denoted configuration P2. Three
one-inch pipes (outer diameter about 34mm) prevented the upper part
of the container from bulging out. The centre of these pipes was about
80mm below the frame that supported the vent panels.
2.2. Measurement system
Fig. 8 summarises the measurement system. Four NI CompactDAQ
Fig. 1. 20-foot ISO container (left) and the interior of the container (right).
Fig. 2. The steel frame (grey) on top of the foundation.
Fig. 3. Dimensions of the steel frame (left) and a cross-section of the U-beam
(right).
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type 9215 (BNC) data acquisition modules from National Instruments,
mounted in a cDAQ-9188XT chassis located in the instrumentation
bunker, recorded the pressure and deflection measurements at a sam-
pling frequency of 100 kHz. A separate National Instruments NI-9201
data logger was used for the concentration measurements. Two Edge-
rtronic SC1 high-speed video cameras and one regular JVC GZ-
RX515BE video camera recorded the explosion events.
Fig. 9 illustrates the position of the vertical jet release (R01) and the
eight internal pressure sensors: P01-P04 (Kistler 701A, high-pressure
quartz transducers), P05-P06 (Kistler 7261, low-pressure quartz
transducers, high-sensitivity) and P07-P08 (Kistler 7031, high-pressure
quartz transducers, acceleration-compensated), all used with Kistler
5073A charge amplifiers. The sensors P01-P02 and P07-P08 were po-
sitioned on the horizontal surface of the U-beams along the side walls of
the container, in the same distances from the back wall as the bolts
holding the frame (Fig. 3), 85 mm from the side wall, and 200mm
above the floor of the container. Sensors P03 and P04 were positioned
at the vertical surface facing the container doors, about 100mm above
Fig. 4. Overall dimensions of a 20-foot ISO container.
Fig. 5. Schematic illustration of container and vent openings.
Fig. 6. Container with six commercial vent panels before and after a test.
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the floor level. The two low-pressure sensors P05 and P06 were posi-
tioned in the blind flanges in the ceiling, between the vent panels and
the doors (Fig. 5). These measurements provide an estimate of the
opening pressure of the vent panels. Due to the symmetry of the geo-
metry, each pair of pressure sensors (P01 & P02, P03 & P04, etc.)
should measure similar values.
Three Kistler 4043A2 piezoresistive absolute pressure gauges with
Kistler 4601 amplifiers measured the far-field blast pressures P09-P11
outside the container, 5, 10 and 15m from the container doors, and
about 1.65m above the ground. Two Acuity AR700-50 Laser displace-
ment sensors, operating at 9.4 kHz, measured the structural displace-
ment of the container walls. A digital thermal mass flow meter and
controller from Brooks Instrument (Model SLA5853-S2EAB2C2A1)
controlled the flow rate of hydrogen into the container. Fig. 10 illus-
trates the position of the concentration measurements in a vertical
cross-section of the container.
Fig. 11 shows the front side of the container with the five sampling
tubes for the Servomex Xendos 2223 oxygen transmitter/analyser in
positions A4′-E4′, and the opposite side of the container with the eight
low-cost oxygen sensors from Teledyne instruments (oxygen sensor
class R-22A) in positions A1-E4. All measurements were taken close to
the side walls. The symmetric location of the vertical row of probes (A4,
B4, etc.) and sampling tubes (A4′, B4′, etc.) near the back wall implies
that the continuous and intermittent concentration measurements
should measure similar concentration profiles for the stratified mixture
inside the container.
Fig. 12 shows the pipe used for the vertical jet release. The pipe had
outer and inner diameters 22mm and 18mm, respectively. The release
point was positioned along the centre line of the container, about 3.2m
from the back wall, 0.30m above the floor, pointing upwards. A flat
plate, with dimensions 0.2m×0.2m, was located about 0.2m below
the release point. This plate was used for tests with diffusive releases
(not part of the blind-prediction study). Measurements with thermo-
couples located in the jet, immediately downstream of the release point,
indicated that the release temperature was within 1–3 °C of the ambient
temperature.
Fig. 8 illustrates the recirculation system that consisted of 4-inch
flexible air ducts, a fan, and two remotely operated butterfly valves
(Fig. 11) for isolating the ducts and fan from the container prior to
ignition. This system was not used for the tests with inhomogeneous
mixtures, but it was installed as a precautionary measure in the event it
would be necessary to empty flammable mixture from a container after
failed ignition.
2.3. Experimental procedure
Gaseous hydrogen was released into the container at a constant flow
rate of 56 Nm3 hr−1 (equivalent to 0.00133 kg s−1) through a vertical
pipe with inner diameter 18mm. The open end of the pipe was located
0.3 m above the floor of the container. The duration of the release was
7.5 min (450 s). Distributed openings in the side walls allowed excess
gas to escape: 20 holes, ten on each side of the container, 51mm (2
inches) in diameter, 100mm above the floor (Fig. 11). The target
nominal (average) fuel concentration Cn at the time of ignition, as-
suming only air escaped from the container, was 21.0 ± 0.5 vol%
(Table 1). However, some fuel may have escaped, either through small
openings in the ceiling or through the openings in the side walls close to
the floor.
Hydrogen concentrations were measured near the corners of the
container, in the opposite end from the container doors (Fig. 10 and
11), during the release and up to the time of ignition. The ignition
source, an inductive spark with energy release about 1mJ, was acti-
vated about 8min (480 s) after the release started (i.e. 30 s after the
release ended). The spark gap was located at the back wall, about 2.0m
above the floor (denoted BU in Table 1). The explosions were vented
through six 1.0 m×1.0m vent openings on the roof of the container
(Fig. 5), covered with single-sheet bulged vent panels from Fike:
Av= 1.0m2, Pstat = 0.10 ± 0.25 bar, and specific weight 6.8 kgm−2.
The container doors were closed.
3. Experimental results
This section summarises the results of the experiments.
3.1. Test matrix
Table 1 summarises the test matrix, including the three commis-
sioning tests without ignition (T39, T42 and T43) and three reference
tests with homogeneous mixtures (T46-T48). Fig. 5 illustrates the lo-
cation of the vent openings, the jet release, the pipe rack and the ig-
nition source. Tests 57 and 59 were repeated tests with frame only (FO),
i.e. without the pipe rack present. Tests 60 and 61 were repeated tests
with the pipe rack in the centre position (P2). Table 2 summarises
Fig. 7. Pipe rack (left) and brackets fixed to frame inside the container (right).
Fig. 8. Schematic overview of the measurement system.
Fig. 9. Approximate positions (mm) for the internal pressure sensors P01-P08.
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selected results from the ignited tests: the maximum reduced explosion
pressures Pmax and the maximum pressure impulse Im recorded by the
internal pressure sensors P01-P08, the maximum deflection Dm and
permanent deformation Dp measured with laser displacement sensors
approximately 14 cm above the centre of the side walls (1.9 m above
the ground), the time tstat and internal pressure Pstat when the panels
started to open, and the approximate times t45, t90 and t180 relative to
tstat when the panels were 45°, 90° and 180° open, respectively. The
asterisks for test numbers 57, 60 and 61 in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that
the test container had to be replaced after these tests due to severe
structural deformation.
3.2. Measurement uncertainties
The range of values given for the maximum reduced explosion
pressures Pmax in Table 2 illustrates the effect of applying digital
smoothing filters, with frequencies 33, 50 and 100 Hz, to the measured
pressure-time histories (Skjold, 2018a,b; Skjold et al., 2019b). The
stated measurement error for the piezoelectric pressure sensors, typi-
cally less than±1% of full-scale output (FSO), is negligible compared
to the inherent uncertainty associated with temperature drift,
smoothing and spread in results between repeated tests. The parameters
Im, Dm and Dp were not sensitive to smoothing, and the laser-based
displacement measurements (Dm and Dp) showed no sign of drift
(Skjold, 2018a,b; Skjold et al., 2019b). The accuracy of the displace-
ment measurements was within±0.002m. The opening times for the
vent panels were estimated from high-speed video recordings. Based on
independent observation of recordings from two cameras in different
locations, the accuracy of the time estimates was estimated to be
within± 0.002 s. The values indicated for Pstat are filtered pressure data
(50 Hz) measured with the two sensors P05 and P06 at time tstat. The
measurement uncertainties of the concentration measurements were
approximately± 0.2 and ±0.6 vol% for the point (Servomex) and
continuous (Teledyne) measurements, respectively. The corresponding
response times for the sensors (0–90 vol% O2) were ten and six seconds.
3.3. Release rates
Fig. 13 summarises the flow rates measured with the digital thermal
mass flow meter and controller. All measurements indicate a near
constant flow rate of 56.0 ± 0.2 Nm3 hr−1 for 450 s. However, it is not
clear whether the deviation from zero (about 3 Nm3 hr−1) in the initial
flow for tests 57 and 59 imply that the actual flow rates for these tests
were closer to 53 Nm3 hr−1, especially since the curve for test 59 re-
turns to zero while the curve for test 57 does not. The concentration
profiles measured at 480 s (Fig. 17) show consistently lower con-
centrations for tests 57 and 59, relative to tests 42 and 43, indicating
Fig. 10. Positions (mm) for the concentration measurements.
Fig. 11. The tubes for the Servomex analyser (above) and the low-cost oxygen
sensors (below).
Fig. 12. Pipe used for vertical jet release.
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reduced flow rates and possible leakage. A constant flow rate at 53 Nm3
hr−1 would correspond to a nominal (average) hydrogen concentration
of about 20 vol% in the container.
3.4. Dispersion and stratification
Fig. 14 summarises the results from two unignited tests: T42 (FO)
and T39 (P2). The vertical dash-dotted lines at 450 s indicate the end of
the releases. There is reasonable agreement between the results ob-
tained with the low-cost oxygen sensors from Teledyne (continuous
Table 2
Selected results for ignited tests, including reference tests with homogeneous mixtures.
Test Pmax (bar) Im (bar-ms) Dm (m) Dp (m) tstat (s) Pstat, P05-P06 (bar) t45 (s) t90 (s) t180 (s)
57* 0.314–0.343 7.9 0.178 0.042 0.082 0.118–0.125 0.022 0.035 0.059
59 0.319–0.342 8.0 0.167 0.030 0.083 0.109–0.111 0.026 0.038 0.061
60* 0.344–0.370 9.6 0.185 0.064 0.096 0.108–0.115 0.025 0.036 0.058
61* 0.514–0.677 11.6 0.382 0.263 0.076 0.107–0.110 0.025 0.034 0.050
46 0.176–0.185 6.6 0.112 0.019 0.107 0.104–0.108 0.032 0.046 0.078
47 0.186–0.197 6.9 0.139 0.023 0.121 0.117–0.122 0.027 0.043 0.072
48 0.171–0.176 7.0 0.124 0.013 0.112 0.107–0.109 0.029 0.046 0.076
Fig. 13. Measured flow rates.
T. Skjold, et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 61 (2019) 220–236
226
lines) and the intermittent measurements with the Servomex analyser
(points). The results demonstrate clear stratification inside the con-
tainer, with maximum hydrogen concentrations around 27 vol% near
the ceiling. The pipe rack (P2) had limited influence on the distribution
of hydrogen inside the enclosure.
Fig. 15 documents the repeatability of the dispersion process for
ignited and unignited releases. The concentrations obtained for ignited
tests 57, 59 and 60 are somewhat lower than the corresponding unig-
nited tests 42 and 39. The results indicate that the flow rate may have
been less than 56 Nm3 hr−1 for tests 57 and 59 (Fig. 13) and that some
fuel may have escaped through the roof. Since all measurements in-
dicate mixtures on the lean side, i.e. below about 30 vol% hydrogen in
air, a lower concentration at the time of ignition would result in lower
maximum reduced explosion pressures in the vented deflagrations.
3.5. Pressure development
Fig. 16 shows smoothed pressure-time histories from the four ig-
nited tests. Skjold (2018a,b) describes the procedures for data proces-
sing and filtering in detail. The vertical dash-dotted lines indicate the
degree of opening for the hinged vent panels. Fig. 17 shows selected
frames from test 61: a) when the vent panels start to open (tstat), b-e)
when the vent panels are approximately 45°, 90°, 180° and 270° open,
and after the test f). For simplicity, and because of significant drift in
some of the signals, the plots show only one pressure-time curve for
each pair of symmetrically placed pressure sensors (Fig. 9). The final
report from the HySEA experiments in 20-foot containers includes the
pressure-time histories for all the 66 vented deflagration tests (Skjold,
2018b). Overall, the overpressures increase somewhat with the in-
troduction of the pipe rack (P2). The highest pressures are obtained for
pressure transducer P7 in test 61. As shown in Fig. 15, this is the only
ignited test where the measured hydrogen concentrations were at the
same level as in the unignited tests.
4. Consequence models
This section introduces the models used by the modellers that par-
ticipated in the blind-prediction benchmark study.
4.1. Empirical and semi-empirical models
Table 3 summarises the models based on empirical or semi-em-
pirical correlations. The calculation time for a given scenario is insig-
nificant for this category of models, but none of the models accounts for
the effect of stratification. Hence, the model predictions assume
homogeneous mixtures with different concentrations. For the sake of
brevity, the models are not described in detail in this paper, but re-
ferences to standards or publications are provided for all models. Since
all model predictions in this category were submitted by the same
group, it is reasonable to assume consistent use of model parameters.
The results for the modified External Cloud Model (ECM-II) were sub-
mitted after the tests had been performed.
The University of Warwick developed the ECM models as part of the
HySEA project (Sinha et al., 2019a,b; Sinha and Wen, 2019). Several
aspects of the ECM models are inspired by and resemble the models
developed by FM Global (Bauwens et al., 2012), including a physics-
based approach for estimating the maximum pressure during vented
deflagrations. Both models include simplified versions based on tabu-
lated bulk parameters for engineering calculations. However, several
aspects of the models are different, and a detailed comparison is outside
the scope of the present paper.
4.2. CFD tools
Table 4 summarises the CFD-based consequence models. The cal-
culation time for a given scenario can vary from less than an hour to
several days. For the sake of brevity, the model descriptions focus on
version numbers, grid resolution, CFL numbers used, and similar
parameters. The model predictions will also depend on other factors,
including how the modeller implements the geometry and how the
computational mesh (grid) is defined relative to the geometry. For
technical details, please refer to the respective user manuals and cited
publications.
5. Model predictions
This section summarises the comparison between experimental re-
sults and model predictions.
5.1. Release and dispersion
Fig. 18 shows the experimental and predicted hydrogen con-
centration profiles at the time of ignition. Several of the model pre-
dictions captured the stratification reasonably well, but some did not.
For prediction M1a, all monitor points were placed relative to the
ground, and not relative to the floor inside the container (i.e. about
0.5 m below the actual measurements). The corrected values (M1b)
capture the stratification reasonably well. The results reported for M3
and M6 do not indicate any significant stratification. Insufficient re-
finement of the grid near the release point can explain the results for
M6. For prediction M7, the actual CFD simulation (M7a) captured the
stratification, but the concentrations were diluted with air from the
outside when the simulated cloud was transferred to coarser grids that
did not coincide with the walls of the enclosure (M7b, M7c, and M7d).
Fig. 19 compares model predictions (lines), and experimental results
(points), for hydrogen concentration in the positions indicated in
Fig. 10 for test configurations with frame only (FO) and pipe rack in the
centre position (P2). The overall results are similar for tests with and
without the pipe rack. The experimental values indicated for position
A4′ (FO) in Fig. 19 are most likely erroneous, possibly due to a leak in
Fig. 14. Hydrogen concentrations for unignited tests with frame only (FO) and
pipe rack (P2).
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the sampling tube.
5.2. Vented explosions
Fig. 20 and Fig. 21 compare the pressure-time histories from ex-
periments and CFD simulations. In general, predictions M1 and M5-M7,
all using the CFD tool FLACS, significantly over-predict the explosion
pressure, whereas the other CFD codes M2-M4 under-predict the pres-
sures.
Fig. 22 summarises the maximum overpressure and corresponding
pressure impulse predicted by the various modellers for both scenarios.
The results reported by M6 and M7 reveal a significant effect of grid
resolution, including opposite trends with and without the pipe rack
(M6).
Fig. 23 summarises the maximum overpressures predicted by the
engineering models for both scenarios, assuming various homogeneous
hydrogen concentrations inside the container. The results show less
variability than the predictions obtained with the CFD tools.
6. Discussion
The two scenarios selected for the second blind-prediction bench-
mark study in the HySEA project were quite challenging from a mod-
elling point of view. A ‘perfect’ model should be able to predict the
stratification of hydrogen during the release, the transient flame pro-
pagation through the inhomogeneous mixture and the pipe rack ob-
stacle, and finally the structural response of the vent panels and the
relatively weak enclosure. However, the application areas for the
models represented in the blind-prediction study include design opti-
misation and risk assessments for industrial facilities, which typically
involve an even broader range of spatial scales and significantly more
complex geometries. As such, the results from the second blind-pre-
diction benchmark study in the HySEA project provide a realistic
measure of the level of accuracy or variability that can be expected
from this type of engineering calculations.
6.1. Measurement uncertainty and repeatability of experiments
The concentration measurements summarised in Fig. 15 and 18
indicate moderate loss of fuel before ignition for tests 57, 59 and 60,
Fig. 15. Hydrogen concentrations for unignited and ignited tests for both scenarios (FO and P2).
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Fig. 16. Experimental pressure-time histories.
Fig. 17. Opening of vent panels for test 61.
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possibly combined with the somewhat lower mass flow in the releases
for test 57 and 59 (Fig. 13). This observation is consistent with the
higher explosion pressures and more severe wall deflection measured in
test 61, compared to test 60 (Table 2 and Fig. 16). Hence, the effect of
introducing the pipe rack (P2) may not be as pronounced as indicated in
Fig. 22 and 23, since the pressures measured without the pipe rack (FO)
probably would have been somewhat higher without loss of fuel. As
mentioned in section 3.2, the uncertainty related to the pressure sensors
is negligible compared to the variability associated with temperature
drift, smoothing during post-processing, and the inherent spread in
results between repeated tests (tests 60 and 61 in Fig. 16). Compared to
the tests with stratified mixtures, the reference tests with homogeneous
mixtures show less variation. However, this can be somewhat mis-
leading since only test 39 involved homogeneous mixture and obstacle
configuration P2 (Table 1). Additional repeated tests would presumably
have resulted in a wider spread in the experimental results.
6.2. Model uncertainty and user dependence for CFD models
The long-duration releases from a relatively small opening and
gradual stratification in a large enclosure implied time-consuming si-
mulations for the CFD codes summarised in Table 4. The varying degree
of accuracy in the predictions of the concentration field inside the
container implies that the initial conditions used for the vented defla-
gration simulations varied significantly between the various models.
Nevertheless, Fig. 18 shows that several modellers predicted the stra-
tification inside the container reasonably well (M1b, M4, M5, and
M7a), given the inherent uncertainty in the experimental results
(Fig. 13 and 15). User errors explain several of the deviations between
model predictions and experimental results, including misplaced
monitor points (M1a), insufficient refinement of the jet release (M6),
and inconsistent transformation of results from one computational grid
to coarser grid resolutions (M7bcd). Measures such as automated
gridding, improved training, better user documentation and certifica-
tion of users can improve the accuracy of the model predictions sig-
nificantly.
The use of a relatively coarse mesh for the dispersion simulations is
the primary explanation for the reduced overall concentration and lack
of stratification in the prediction with HyFOAM (M3 in Fig. 18). Limited
spatial resolution resulted in excess diffusion of hydrogen, rapid
mixing, and hence minimal stratification (similar to prediction M6).
Furthermore, to reduce the simulation time, the computational mesh
covered only the interior of the container, and atmospheric boundary
conditions were applied for the 20 holes along the walls. This approach
resulted in pressure gradients inside the enclosure during the release,
discharge of hydrogen, and lower fuel concentrations.
Significant deviations in the prediction of the concentration field in
the flammable cloud will inevitably influence the predictions for the
maximum reduced explosion pressure. As such, it is not straightforward
to interpret the significant spread in maximum explosion pressure and
Table 3
Empirical and semi-empirical models.
Modeller Model Reference Assumptions
M-8 EN 14994 EN 14994 (2007) Homogeneous: 21 or 25 vol.% hydrogen in air.
M-8 NFPA-68 NFPA-68 (2013) Homogeneous: 21 or 25 vol.% hydrogen in air.
M-8 FM Global Bauwens et al. (2012) Homogeneous: 21 or 25 vol.% hydrogen in air.
M-8 Molkov Molkov and Bragin (2015) Homogeneous: 21 or 25 vol.% hydrogen in air.
M-8 ECM-I Sinha et al. (2018), Sinha and Wen (2018) Homogeneous: 21 or 25 vol.% hydrogen in air.
M-8 ECM-II Sinha et al. (2019a,b), Sinha and Wen (2019) Homogeneous: 24 vol.% hydrogen in air.
Table 4
Overview of the CFD tools used in the blind-prediction benchmark study.
Modeller Model description
M-1 FLACS v10.6 r3 (Gexcon, 2018)
Release and dispersion simulations with 0.10 m grid cells, local refinement near leak (0.016 m), and variable CFL conditions. The explosion simulations used 0.10 m
uniform grid with initial conditions from dispersion simulation after 480 s. Pressure relief panels modelled as pop-out panels with activation pressure 0.10 bar.
M-2 Fluidyn
Minimum grid resolution 0.007 m (FO) and 0.00092 m (P2). Computational time steps 0.1 s for the release scenarios and 0.00005 s for the explosion scenarios. The
simulation used a symmetry plane, standard k-ε turbulence model and the modified Bray–Moss–Libby (BML) combustion model with single-step reactions.
M-3 HyFOAM (Rao and Wen, 2019)
Large eddy simulation (LES) solver developed within the OpenFOAM framework. Flame wrinkling combustion model with additional sub-models to account for flame
instabilities in lean hydrogen-air mixtures deflagrations, including Lewis number effects.
M-4 ADREA-HF (Venetsanos et al., 2010)
Symmetry plane, standard k-ε turbulence model with additional buoyancy terms and ideal gas assumption. Release and dispersion simulations with inlet resolved by
two cells (minimum size 0.009 m), and CFL = 40 (time step = 0.015 s during release), and total number of cells 664 576 and 912 789 for the FO and P2 case,
respectively. Combustion simulations with approximately uniform grid (0.05 m cell size) inside the enclosure for the FO case, refinement to 0.03 m in non-vertical
directions for the obstacle in the P2 case, Yakhot equation for turbulent burning velocity, modifications to account for flame instabilities, and total number of cells 1
758 120 and 1 919 580 for the FO and P2 case, respectively. All the six vent panels were assumed to open instantaneously and simultaneously when the overpressure
at the position of the middle pair of panels reached 0.1 bar.
M-5 FLACS v10.6 r3 (Gexcon, 2018)
Release and dispersion scenarios modelled with compressible solver and CFLV = 2 for efficient calculations. Base grid for dispersion 0.20 m in horizontal and 0.10 m
in the vertical direction, automatic refinement around leak (0.018 m) and 0.05 m vertical in the lower part of the enclosure. Explosion simulations with 0.10 m grid
resolution inside the container and outside vent, and 0.20 m outside the container. A sensitivity study on panel weight and the effective opening area indicated a
limited impact on simulation results.
M-6 FLACS v10.6 r3 (Gexcon, 2018)
Release and dispersion simulations with 0.07 m grid cells and local refinement near leak (0.045 m), and 0.06 (a), 0.07 (b), 0.08 (c) and 0.10 m (d) grid cells for
explosion simulations. Boundary conditions: NOZZLE for dispersion cases and PLANE WAVE for explosion cases. The density of hydrogen used for converting between
mass and volume flow assumed ambient temperature of 15 °C.
M-7 FLACS 10.2 (Gexcon, 2018)
Grid resolution 0.10 m (a) for dispersion simulations, and conversion of the resulting cloud to coarser meshes (b-d) using the rd-file utility in FLACS. Grid resolution
0.10 (a), 0.15 (b), 0.20 (c) and 0.30 m (d) for explosion simulations. Dispersion simulations used CFLV = 5 and CFLC = 125, and explosion simulations used CFLV =
0.5 and CFLC = 5.
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impulse for model predictions M6 (abcd) and M7 (bcd). The results
from the CFD simulations vary significantly with grid resolution. Since
it is not straightforward to obtain grid convergence for porosity/dis-
tributed resistance (PDR) models, such as FLACS, a short-term solution
for users of the software may entail updated grid guidelines for sce-
narios with highly reactive fuels, such as hydrogen.
It is not straightforward to predict the effect of the coupling between
the moving walls and the propagating flame on the rate of combustion
and pressure build-up inside the enclosure. None of the models listed in
Table 4 includes the effect of the structural response of weak en-
closures, such as shipping containers. Significant deflection of the
container walls increases the volume of the enclosure, which may result
in lower explosion pressures compared to a rigid structure (Rao and
Wen, 2018; Atanga et al., 2019). Fig. 17 illustrates how significant
deformation of the walls creates additional openings in the container,
such as the gap between the upper edge of the side walls and the steel
frame supporting the vent panels. The severe bulging of the doors in test
61 also resulted in a temporary opening. However, the pressure-time
histories in Fig. 16 show that the maximum pressure is reached by the
time the vent panels are approximately 45° open (Fig. 17b), which may
indicate that the effect of two-way coupling between combustion and
structural response is limited for these tests.
The values for Pstat in Table 2 indicate that the vent panels opened
consistently in all tests, and Fig. 16 shows that the maximum reduced
explosion pressures occurred when the vent panels had opened ap-
proximately 45°. Hence, the most critical part of the venting process
took place well before the panels were fully open. None of the three
models that under-predict the explosion pressure in Fig. 22 (M2, M3,
and M4) considered the actual opening time and movement of the vent
panels. The areas covered by the panels were treated as closed until the
internal pressure reached a static opening pressure of 0.1 bar, and
thereafter as fully open. This modelling approach results in an ideal
venting device, which hardly can be realised in practice, and this is
likely to have contributed significantly to the under-prediction of Pmax.
The CFD tool FLACS (M1, M5, M6 and M7) includes sub-grid models for
various types of venting devices, including hinged panels. However,
investigations conducted in the aftermath of the blind-prediction study
revealed that the results are quite sensitive to the representation of the
vent panels, including the dynamic response of the panels. Future
modelling work should focus on improving the representation of rea-
listic explosion venting devices in CFD tools (EN 14797, 2006).
6.3. Model uncertainty and user dependence for empirical and semi-
empirical models
None of the simplified models summarised in Table 3 includes the
effect of stratification. Hence, it was only possible to investigate the
effect of varying the fuel concentration throughout the enclosure.
Makarov et al. (2018) have proposed a model for inhomogeneous hy-
drogen-air mixtures, but this model was not included in the blind-pre-
diction study.
Compared to the predictions obtained with CFD tools (Fig. 22), the
predictions obtained with the empirical and semi-empirical models
show less variation (Fig. 23). This observation is hardly surprising,
since the geometry of a 20-foot shipping container is relatively simple,
and the same group submitted all the predictions with simple models.
As such, the results in Fig. 23 do not include any variation between
different modellers using the same model. Furthermore, the stratifica-
tion of hydrogen inside the container resulted in a highly reactive layer
beneath the ceiling, and limited effect of the internal pipe rack obstacle
on flame propagation and pressure build-up in the experiments. The
effect of stratification is evident in the experimental results and should
be accounted for by empirical or semi-empirical models for vented
hydrogen deflagrations.
Since containers used for hydrogen energy applications usually
contain various types of equipment, and the presence of obstacles can
have pronounced effect on flame acceleration and pressure build-up
(Skjold et al., 2019b), empirical or semi-empirical models for vented
deflagrations in weak enclosures should account for the effect on in-
ternal geometry. However, it is not straightforward to include the effect
of complex geometry in simple models, and Fig. 23 shows that only
three of the simple models predict a noticeable effect of the obstacle
(Bauwens et al., 2012; Molkov and Bragin, 2015; Sinha et al., 2019a,b;
Sinha and Wen, 2019). The latest edition of the NFPA standard also
include the effect of obstacles (NFPA 68, 2018), but this model was not
included in the blind-prediction study. In summary, there is significant
potential for improving the performance of simplified models for
vented hydrogen deflagrations (Lakshmipathy et al., 2019).
6.4. Implications and suggestions for further work
It is foreseen that the increasing demand for sustainable energy
solutions will result in increased use of hydrogen as an energy carrier in
society. Since fires and explosions represent a significant hazard for
most hydrogen installations, specific measures are often required for
reducing the risk to a tolerable level. Both quantitative risk assessments
(QRAs) and optimal design of hydrogen installations require reliable
and reasonably accurate consequence models. However, some specific
properties of hydrogen complicate the modelling of vented deflagra-
tions significantly. Hydrogen is highly reactive, and flames in lean
hydrogen-air mixtures are inherently unstable. Loss of containment in a
confined space is likely to result in a stratified mixture that, if ignited,
can produce significantly higher explosion pressures compared to a lean
homogeneous mixture containing the same amount of hydrogen.
Regardless of the uncertainty and inherent variability in the ex-
perimental results, the significant spread in model predictions and the
deviations between model predictions and experiments suggest that
there is considerable potential for improving the models for vented
hydrogen deflagrations. The large spread in the predictions by mod-
ellers using the same CFD tool demonstrates a need for improved
documentation and training for users. The variability can also be re-
duced by implementing automated and carefully validated procedures
Fig. 18. Concentration profiles at the time of ignition.
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Fig. 19. Model predictions for hydrogen dispersion with frame only (FO) and pipe rack (P2).
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Fig. 20. Predicted pressure-time histories for models M1-M5.
T. Skjold, et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 61 (2019) 220–236
233
for setting up simulations, including the generation of the computa-
tional mesh.
It is essential for safety engineers to be aware of the inherent lim-
itations of the model systems they use, and to critically evaluate the
model predictions considering available experiments and documented
model performance from systematic validation studies (Skjold et al.,
2013; Tolias et al., 2018). Further blind-prediction benchmark studies
for realistic accident scenarios in full-scale geometries is required for
documenting the predictive capabilities of models and modellers, and
hence the inherent uncertainty associated with risk assessments for
hydrogen installations in industry and society in general.
7. Conclusions
The second blind-prediction benchmark study in the HySEA project
explored a two-stage chain of events, starting with release and disper-
sion of hydrogen inside a 20-foot ISO container, followed by vented
deflagrations. Although several modellers predicted the stratification of
hydrogen inside the container with reasonable accuracy, the large
spread in results for the maximum reduced explosion pressure suggests
that the scenarios represented a significant challenge for modellers. It is
foreseen that the blind-prediction benchmark exercises performed as
part of the HySEA project will contribute to increased awareness
amongst developers and users of advanced consequence models, as well
as model improvements and updated documentation and guidelines.
Fig. 21. Predicted pressure-time histories for models M6 and M7.
Fig. 22. Summary of results for the CFD tools.
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